EGYPT'S POST-ARAB SPRING REVOLUTION EXPLANATION FOR DEMOCRATISATION FAILURE

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Abstract

Fenomena Musim Semi Arab memicu kepercayaan internasional tentang proses demokratisasi Timur Tengah. Terpilihnya Muhammad Morsi (Ikhwanul Muslimin) secara demokratis sebagai Presiden Mesir merupakan salah satu kemenangan revolusi Musim Semi Arab yang paling signifikan. Namun, pada tanggal 3 Juli 2013, Jenderal Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi, Kepala Angkatan Bersenjata Mesir, melakukan kudeta untuk menggulingkan pemerintahan Morsi. Tindakan tersebut jelas tidak sesuai dengan prinsip-prinsip demokrasi. Kegagalan proses demokratisasi ini menjadi topik utama penelitian ini. Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah untuk memahami penyebab kegagalan demokratisasi di Mesir pasca gerakan Arab Spring 201. Penulis menjelaskan fenomena tersebut dengan menggunakan teknik kualitatif dengan metodologi analisis deskriptif Miles dan Huberman, serta tiga teori: Teori modernisasi dari Seymour Lipset, teori aktor politik dari Huntington, dan teori lingkungan internasional dari Philip C. Schmitter. Laporan ini menemukan bahwa ada tiga penyebab yang berkontribusi terhadap kegagalan demokratisasi Mesir: kurangnya kondisi ekonomi, hubungan antara MB (Ikhwanul Muslimin) dan Salafi, kurangnya dukungan internasional, dan campur tangan negara GCC.

Kata kunci: *Ikhwanul Muslimin, Pemilu Demokratis, Arab Spring, Kudeta*

Abstract

The Arab Spring phenomena fueled international confidence in the Middle East's democratization process. The democratic election of Muhammad Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) as President of Egypt was one of the Arab Spring Revolution's most significant victories. However, on July 3, 2013, General Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi, the Head of Egypt's Armed Forces, conducted a coup to topple Morsi's rule. That action is incompatible with democratic principles. The failure of this democratization process is the primary subject of this research. The purpose of this article is to understand the contributing causes to Egypt's democratization failure following the Arab Spring movement of 201. The author explains the phenomena using a qualitative technique with Miles and Huberman's descriptive-analysis methodology, as well as three theories: Seymour Lipset's modernization theory, Huntington's political actor theory, and Philip C. Schmitter's international environment theory. This report discovered that three causes contributed to Egypt's democratization failure: a lack of economic conditions, a relationship between the MB (Muslim Brotherhood) and Salafis, a lack of international backing, and GCC state meddling.

Keywords; *Muslim Brotherhood, democratic elections, Arab uprising, coup d Etat.*

1. Introduction

The Arab Spring events in the Middle East in 2011 elicited a positive response from the international community, with many hoping that the Arab Spring represented the world's fourth wave of democratization and had the potential to destabilize authoritarian regimes in the region (Guenaien, 2014). Regardless of geographical, economic, religious, demographic, or governmental structure, protests have taken place in almost every Arab nation to abolish dictatorial regimes and establish democracy (Rutledge, 2024). Egypt was one of four Middle Eastern nations to witness the Arab Spring movement (the others being Libya, Tunisia, and Syria). The collapse of Hosni Mubarak's autocratic dictatorship, which had been in power for thirty years, showed the immense desire to establish a democratic government. There were various reasons why Egyptians were dissatisfied with Mubarak's government. Corruption, restricted freedom of expression, economic issues such as food price inflation, and significant unemployment in Egypt sparked civil society rallies against the government (Rezaei, 2015). The Egyptian populace is largely focused on social and political transformation, specifically the ousting of Hosni Mubarak's dictatorial regime. The people are optimistic that the old system will be replaced with a new democratic one (Turan, 2020).

On February 11, 2011, the Egyptian military deposed Mubarak in a coup. For eighteen days, hundreds of Egyptians demanded that the military take power. Nine months after Mubarak's ouster, Egypt had general elections, which the Muslim Brotherhood won through the democratic election of President Mohammad Mursi (N. J. Brown, 2013). This first civilian government was supposed to shift Egypt's political system towards democracy. However, Morsi's election as Egypt's president did not mark the end of authoritarian control in the nation, as proven by the military coup launched by Egyptian Armed Forces Chief General Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi on July 3, 2013. Kelompok militer menggunakan berbagai permasalahan domestik dalam pemerintahan Mursi sebagai tiket bagi mereka untuk menggulingkan rezim (Saidin & Storm, 2024). This tragedy has hindered Egypt's democratization progress; furthermore, the perpetrator of the coup, General Al-Sisi, was elected president of Egypt in 2014 (Bashar, 2015).

Several analysts have concluded that the Muslim Brotherhood's lack of readiness was the primary factor behind the downfall of Egyptian democracy under Mursi. In his study, Muqtedar Khan argues that this Islamist group's failure stemmed from their inability to convince the Egyptian population that Islam and democracy are compatible, due to the negative perception of previous Islamic movements as anti-democratic (M. Khan, 2014). Furthermore, Nathan J. Brown's book "Egypt's Failed Transition" reveals that the Muslim Brotherhood's misjudgments, such as using violence against protesters, concealing acts of violence by the government, and pressuring the media, contributed to the collapse of Egyptian democracy following the Arab Spring (J. Brown, 2013). Meanwhile, Khan and Lumpur emphasize that the absence of stable political institutions, low democratic standards, and the lack of a thriving civil society are significant barriers (Atawna & Othman, 2015; R. Khan et al., 2020). Del Panta highlights the substantial impact of global ideologies and internal legacies that have hindered the progress of popular movements and alternative political systems (Del Panta, 2022). Another

study finds a cultural aspect to the issue, proposing that the effort to maintain Egypt's national character has resulted in the loss of civil and political liberties (Pratt, 2005).

Although earlier studies have been conducted, the reasons for the failure of democracy in Egypt during the transition from Mubarak to Mursi are still not fully understood and often only consider certain factors. Several interpretations primarily focus on the internal issues of the Muslim Brotherhood, the internal challenges faced by the Egyptian state, or the ideological and identity disparities in Egypt. The objective of this research is to address these areas of limited understanding by investigating a wider array of pertinent components. By taking into account many aspects derived from modernization theory, the global context, and political actors. This study aims to offer a more thorough insight into the reasons behind the failure of democratic transition in Egypt during this crucial period.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

This study utilizes a qualitative research strategy that adopts a descriptive-analytical technique. The objective is to get a thorough comprehension of the elements that have led to the breakdown of democracy in Egypt during the transition from Mubarak to Mursi.

Data were gathered from several sources:

a. Analysis of the document: An exhaustive examination of pertinent documents was conducted, encompassing scholarly articles, governmental reports, policy papers, media coverage, and publications by non-governmental organizations. The documents provide historical background and comprehensive narratives of events and decisions throughout the transition era.

b. Observation: Public discourse and media coverage were closely monitored during significant events in the transition period. This involved the examination of news broadcasts, social media engagement, and public declarations made by significant individuals.

Data analysis

The data were examined utilizing a methodical and detailed analytical technique. This process consisted of multiple stages:

a. Data Collection: The gathered data were methodically categorized to discover reoccurring themes and trends. This methodology utilised both inductive and deductive coding methodologies to ensure the comprehensive capture of both anticipated and unforeseen topics.

b. Thematic Analysis: The data that was collected was then analyzed thematically to reveal hidden themes and connections between various parameters. This analysis provided a clear understanding of the different aspects of the democratic transition and the factors that led to its failure.

c. Triangulation was employed to augment the dependability and accuracy of the findings. This entailed corroborating information from several data sources and methodologies to ensure the coherence of the conclusions.

d. Analysis: The last stage was analyzing the findings within the framework of current literature and theoretical frameworks. This analysis facilitated the placement of the research results within the wider discussion on democratic transitions and the identification of any distinctive elements that are particular to the Egyptian context.

2. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Many hypotheses have been proposed to explain the process of democratic transition during the third wave of democratization. The first and second waves occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, respectively, with economic development serving as the primary driver, followed by an elite dedication to the democratization process. In this article, I will utilize a variety of perspectives to investigate the variables that have contributed to Egypt's democratization failure, including modernization theory, the international environment, and political players.

Egypt's economic unpreparedness for democracy

According to modernization theory, socioeconomic growth and democracy are linked, with poorer nations having a more difficult time transitioning to democracy than richer countries. Seymour Lipset agrees with this statement: "The more prosperous a country is, the more likely it is to maintain democracy (Cintra, 2007)." Modernization strengthens people's ability to be receptive, resolve differences, and compromise. Modern society will seek to prevent conflict and decrease the possibility for radical and extremist organizations to develop, therefore legitimizing the implementation of democracy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001).

In addition to political turmoil, Egypt's economic position is deteriorating, with rising inflation and unemployment. There is a significant disparity between the affluent and the poor; Egypt's middle class, which makes up the bulk of the population, has grown destitute. Four to five million Egyptians fall within the lower middle class, earning between $2.00 and $4.00 a day (Rivlin, 2010).

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Egypt's economic growth in 2011 was only 1.5%, far lower than the 5.5% (Rivlin, 2010) growth rate under the Mubarak period. Economic growth of 1.5% is insufficient when compared to Egypt's population growth of 1.7% each year (Abdou & Zaazou, 2013). The mismatch between population expansion and economic growth is deteriorating Egypt's economic condition, as is the increase in unemployment; over 1.5 million Egyptians join the labour force each year, while the number of jobs available in the market is only around 250,000 (Abdou & Zaazou, 2013). As a result, the number of jobless in Egypt will rise by 1,250,000 individuals per year. The economic slump

has made it difficult for the market to grow the number of workers, particularly those with higher education, such as university degrees.

Financially, the Mursi administration confronts the arduous job of controlling the budget deficit and implementing new fiscal policies that are seen to be capable of saving Egypt from its debts. Egypt's budget deficit was 11% of its GDP in 2012 and is anticipated to rise to 13% in 2013 (Samhouri, 2016). As a result, the administration determined that receiving foreign help was the only way to solve the country's economic woes. Egypt received IMF aid on the condition that the government conduct fiscal reforms, including raising taxes and eliminating subsidies, to enhance the efficiency of public expenditure. The administration recognized that this strategy would be met with widespread disapproval and opposition (Rivlin, 2010).Among the numerous demonstrations against this strategy, one of the most visible was the rejection of Salafi organizations that condemned capitalism. This organization thinks that loan interest violates Islamic values and is "haram" under the law (Guenaien, 2014).

In addition to the issue of enormous governmental debts and deficits, the Morsi administration had to cope with the military's role in the Egyptian economy. Excessive military spending and participation will always be a barrier to economic progress in Egypt. The overall number of military troops is around half a million, with two million individuals working in ministries; in Egypt, the ratio of civil society to society is one to forty (Samhouri, 2016)

The Egyptian military acquired considerable authority under the Muslim Brotherhood's administration since they were given total control over their budget. The Egyptian military has a significant economic impact since it controls enterprises in a variety of industries and owns vast areas of land. Due to the secrecy surrounding the military budget, there is no official statistic for the money received by Egyptian military personnel (Abdul-Magd, 2012). Some scholars believe that the military controls one-third of Egypt's economy. The military's companies would be more efficient and profitable if they were run by foreigners rather than military officials who lack a business mindset and background. By maximizing the operations of these companies, Egypt will create new jobs and reduce its unemployment rate.

Economic factors were a major challenge for President Mursi, as Egypt was also facing the impact of the global economic crisis in 2008. This increased the price of staple foods around the world. Unfortunately, the Mursi government had promised before the election that it would solve the problem of basic food needs in Egypt within the first 100 days of its administration. More than 60% of Egyptian families have to eat government-subsidized bread. So this is a tough promise for President Mursi. This is one of the triggers for the emergence of protests from the people because it is considered that the government did not fulfill its promise in 100 days which was disappointing (TURAN & BİNGÖL, 2020).

The facts presented above are intended to demonstrate the challenges encountered by the Mursi government in terms of economic reform. The demonstrators' demands for "bread, freedom, and dignity" were highlighted during the Arab Spring movement in January 2011 . Economic issues become one of the most pressing concerns for Egyptians. As a result, the public had great hopes for positive economic progress during Mursi's rule. However, as

previously stated, there were several barriers and challenges experienced throughout the implementation of these changes. This shaky economic position also hampered Egypt's democratization process, as indicated by the modernity theory.

The role of Egyptian political actors in democratization

According to Huntington, Rustow, and Przeworski, a society's elites play a significant role in the shift from authoritarian to democratic government, and their support and dedication to democracy is critical to a successful transition (Samuel, 1991). During the transition to democracy, political players face conflicts of interest, but they must remain unified against the authoritarian system and devoted to achieving democracy.

Following the Arab Spring of 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood, the election's winning party, clashed with Salafists and secularists (Leckie, 2012). This division in Egyptian politics presents significant difficulty for the Mursi government in reaching an accord on the compatibility of Islam with democratization. Although President Mursi proclaimed his commitment to democratic administration immediately after being elected as Egypt's president, many other political players lost faith in the Muslim Brotherhood once it obtained power and became exclusive when Mursi won the election (Nordland, 2012).

The Muslim Brotherhood's reputation as a democratic player remains debatable following its inability to democratize under Mursi. However, the Muslim Brotherhood has been trying to facilitate Egypt's democratic transition. The Muslim Brotherhood has promoted social justice, religious tolerance, and political plurality through its activities. Through student organizations and other organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood emphasizes the promotion of democratic values regardless of religion, ethnicity, or race (Zahid, 2010). Hudaibi writes in his essay, Islam in Politics and Power, that the Muslim Brotherhood has political opinions on a variety of problems, including political pluralism, violence, and interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood's efforts in the transition process may not always result in a smooth democratization process without making concessions with other political players; the following is an example of the connection between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis (Pargeter, 2013).

IM's ties with the Salafis (Al-Nur Party)

After the Arab Spring and the fall of the Mubarak dictatorship, many analysts believed that the alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis was formed solely to counter the influence of liberal and secular parties and that it would not endure long. It was clear that after a few months, the two parties' partnership had broken down and they had become adversaries (Kirkpatrick, 2011). The fundamental source of antagonism between the two parties may be found in their opposing philosophies. Salafism is a movement that prioritizes the practice of Islam as it was practiced by the first generation of Muslims, namely in line with the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, in which the Koran and hadiths of the apostle Muhammad constitute the primary foundation in Muslims' beliefs and lives (Kirkpatrick, 2011). According to Jonathan Brown, before the revolution, Salafi organizations were not politically engaged. Furthermore, they think that "a Muslim should not rebel or fight against the leader"(J. A. C.

Brown, 2011) This made Mubarak more accepting of Salafist groups, and he utilized them to counterweight the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood, like the Salafis, bases its philosophy on the Quran and hadith, but unlike the Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood incorporates certain Western concepts and is more tolerant of secular parties (Revkin & Samaan, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood welcomed the advancement of contemporary science and hired several Western-educated intellectuals. The Muslim Brotherhood also adopted Western notions like revolution and democracy but with a distinct interpretation and reference to the West, notably Sharia. In his understanding, President Mursi recognized numerous parallels between Sharia and Western democracy, including women's rights, freedom of expression, and religious minority protection (Revkin & Samaan, 2012). Salafis, on the other hand, are opposed to modernism and all things Western. While the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to allay liberal concerns about Islamist party dominance by emphasizing tolerance and pluralism, Salafis demonstrated a strong desire to implement Islamic law in areas such as banking, alcohol prohibition, women's clothing, and Sharia-compliant entertainment (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

There was a significant change in Salafi groups after the Arab Spring, the group initially largely rejected participation in formal politics and adopted an apolitical or militant stance. However, after the overthrow of Mubarak, several Salafi political parties were formed (Gauvain, 2011). Based on the results of the first Egyptian election after the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood won 47.18% of the vote and 235 seats in the assembly, while in second place was the Salafist Nur Party with 121 seats or 25% of the vote, indicating that the existence of Salafi parties was able to curb the monopoly of the Muslim Brotherhood as the only Islamist actor in formal politics (Lacroix & Shalata, 2016).

The Muslim Brotherhood recognized that the rise of this Salafi movement would have an impact on the secularist and Coptic Christian groupings in parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood tends to ignore and disappoint the hopes of the Salafists to gain influence in the government or in the nomination of governors and city councils. (Al-Awadi, 2013). The conflict between the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood erupted after President Mursi fired one of his Nur party advisors, Khaled Alam Eldin, on grounds of abuse of authority.

The Salafis were outraged by the Muslim Brotherhood's treatment of them and its efforts to limit Salafi's authority. The Muslim Brotherhood wanted the Salafis to support them without presenting their group's goal, which infuriated the Salafis, as one of Nur's party members stated, "We despise being followers." (al-Anani, 2015) The Salafis understood that ousting the Muslim Brotherhood from the government would give them more political influence, thus the Salafis in the Nur Party opted to join the secular NSP.

The conflict between these two factions, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafists, was one of the elements that contributed to Egypt's democratic transition failure. When political players are not devoted to democratization and there is a power struggle between these two factions in the government, Egypt's political stability suffers.

International Influence on Egypt's Democratic Transition

The international approach highlights the existence of global and regional democratic forces, as well as economic dependency, in the democratic transition process, while also describing how international organizations assist in deciding whether or not a country's democratization process is successful (Schmitter, 1993). A country can interfere in a country's democratic transition process, often known as democratic conditionally (McFaul et al., 2007). This action might take the shape of financial assistance, trade or market access, security assurances, or participation in certain groups. In addition to assistance, punishments can be used as a kind of intervention (McFaul et al., 2007).

In Egypt, the international community's role in the democratic transition process was suboptimal. On the one hand, the lack of internal security and compromise among Egypt's top leaders resulted in limited US and EU support for Egypt's democratization process at the time. This lack of Western backing was also attributable to Egyptians' rising distrust of the United States and a desire to isolate themselves from outsiders. On the other side, the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries, which provided Egypt with financial help throughout Mubarak's administration, ceased to do so when the Muslim Brotherhood took power. Except for Qatar, all GCC countries ceased their assistance.

The following is an explanation of the international community's impact on Egypt during the democratic transition,

The Gulf States' Rejection of Democracy

Egypt's democratization process faces significantly more complicated hurdles than prior democratic transitions. In addition to the bad economy and the political elite's lack of commitment to democracy, Egypt faced foreign threats from the Gulf governments. These nations consider democracy and the growth of new Islamic movements as a danger to their monarchical forms of governance, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman all working together to limit the impact of democratization in the Middle East.

Apart from Qatar, other Gulf governments perceived the Arab Spring as a challenge to the monarchy's survival. When Ben Ali (former President of Tunisia) was forced to resign on January 14, 2011, following two weeks of protests, Saudi Arabia supplied him with a residence and refused to give him over to Tunisian authorities. Similarly, when Egypt's demonstrations escalated, Saudi Arabia backed Mubarak till the end and chastised Obama for not backing Mubarak as one of America's allies. This image demonstrates how important it is for Saudi Arabia to preserve its role as a regional power (Yom & Gause III, 2012).

However, the Gulf states' backing for Egypt shifted soon after the Muslim Brotherhood won the election. The Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with the GCC nations has been strained from its inception; during Mubarak's reign, Egypt was regarded as Saudi Arabia's strongest partner to balance Iran's strength in the Middle East. The GCC nations are unsure if Mursi would preserve the alliance connection or not; nonetheless, the GCC expects that Mursi will respect the regional status quo and not intervene in the GCC countries' domestic affairs (Colombo et al., 2012).

At the start of the revolution, Saudi Arabia and the UAE promised Egypt $7.25 billion in financial help but only contributed $500 million since the GCC nations were skeptical of the Muslim Brotherhood's intentions (Colombo et al., 2012). Unlike Mubarak, Mursi sought to conduct foreign policy in a new way, to develop diversified commercial links with numerous nations, one of which being Iran, as well as strengthening relations with Turkey. Mursi also feels that the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran causes instability and division in the Middle East. In addition, Mursi volunteered himself as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which resulted in four major Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt (Grewal, 2023).

Saudi Arabia saw Egypt's tight relationship with Iran as a warning and began to view the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to their kingdom. In addition to the ties between Egypt and Turkey, the two Islamic countries have the potential to establish a new order of power in the region, shifting predominance away from Saudi Arabia (Ragab, 2012).

While the GCC nations saw Egypt as a danger, Qatar views the Arab Spring upheaval as an opportunity. Qatar supported Egypt in order to protect its interests in the area. During President Mursi's transition phase, other GCC nations accused Qatar of backing the Muslim Brotherhood dictatorship. This charge was based on Aljazeera TV's support for the Arab Spring movement and the Muslim Brotherhood regime (Ragab, 2012).

Following the strained relationship between the GCC nations, with the exception of Qatar, and the Muris government, Saudi Arabia devised a plan to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. The greatest option that the GCC nations could employ was to assist the Egyptian military. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates gave $12 million in help immediately after President Mursi was deposed by the military. This suggests that the GCC nations' primary goal is to destabilise the Mursi administration throughout the transition to a democratic Egypt (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008).

The Nur Party's transition from a collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood to a coalition with the NSP and military assistance was also purportedly influenced by GCC nations. Some activists, including Mohammad el-Baradei and other liberals, acknowledge that the Nur Party may have received financial aid from Saudi Arabia after the military restored power of Egypt (J. Brown, 2013).

Lack of support from the international community.

The primary issue with Mursi's authority throughout the transition phase was a lack of agreement and commitment among political groups to achieving democracy. The polarisation that occurred during the Muslim Brotherhood regime's eighteen months can be attributed to the political elite's continued adherence to authoritarian values, as well as political actors' inexperience in overcoming ideological differences in a democratic environment. During the early phases of the transition, democracies were expected to intervene to avoid division in Egyptian politics. The United States and the European Union failed to play a role as mediators between Islamists and secularists in Egypt.

What prevents the US and EU from intervening is Egyptians' hostility and reluctance to accept foreign help and meddling in their local affairs. Citizens worry that Western meddling will stifle the democratic transition process. According to Al-Akhbar magazine, the growth in anti-American sentiment has prohibited Egyptian political actors from receiving help from America, as stated in the headline "Egypt refuses advice from the American Satan".(Schneider, 2013)

3. CONCLUSION

The military coup that transpired two years following the Arab Spring cannot be attributed to a singular origin; instead, a multitude of factors led to its unfolding. In this discussion, the author identifies three primary factors that have contributed to the failure of democratization in Egypt. Initially, Egypt's economic circumstances emphasize its insufficient preparedness to sustain its democratic revolution, revealing a significant aspect of its political milieu. Furthermore, the obstruction of the democratic process is significantly influenced by the lack of willingness to compromise and demonstrate commitment among political elites. Additionally, the author highlights the deficiencies in the socio-political climate, which manifest as a dearth of synchronized efforts and agreement among key stakeholders. Notwithstanding these obstacles, Egypt's capacity to embrace democracy remains unimpaired. The Arab Spring uprising of 2011 showcases Egypt's robust civil society, which remains actively engaged in addressing the country's difficulties, demonstrating a broad desire for substantial transformation rather than apathy. Therefore, although the journey toward democracy is difficult, the continuous engagement and activism of the Egyptian population exemplify the nation's underlying aspirations for democracy.

This research is notable for its thorough examination, which combines several aspects such as economic, political, and socio-political factors, in order to offer a comprehensive picture of the problems Egypt faces in achieving democratization. The study provides a detailed perspective on how internal and international influences shape Egypt's political environment, considering many components derived from modernization theory, the global setting, and political actors. In addition, it provides fresh perspectives by emphasizing the tenacity and proactive involvement of Egypt's civil society, which, despite obstacles, persists in its pursuit of democratic transformation. This approach highlights the intricate nature of democratic transitions and the possibility of future democratic progress in Egypt.

4.   BIBLIOGRAPHY

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